This would be an example of a total failure of operational security. What organization would go to the trouble of "air gaping" their hardware and then create an open window for the world to look in on? And what kind of op-sec protocols would tolerate the unmonitored presence of thumb drives and removable disks of any kind when there is a possible purpose of uploading malware? Might as well provide unrestricted access to your local area network!
Back in the day, "black" systems were placed inside Faraday cages with controlled and monitored admission through a bank-vault type of door with copper finger-seals around the edges. All the power lines and telephone lines that penetrated the Faraday cage had special filters installed to suppress unauthorized signals from entering or leaving the Faraday cage environment. Anything connected to a computer (keybaords, monitors, removable storage devices) had to pass a TEMPEST emission test. Then, and only then, could the room become a certified
SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility).
So, no air gap back then, but only because we didn't know (yet) just how sneaky attacks could be. Below is an image of a typical entrance to a SCIF. Doors could and would be more elaborate, depending on the nature of the classified material being safeguarded by the SCIF. The U.S. Government became downright paranoid about SCIF security dating back to at least when the Soviets implanted numerous
"bugs" in the new U.S. Embassy they "kindly" built for our use in the 1960s.
I would have to classify the link posted by
@poor mystic in his post #19 as "fake news". Just try flying a drone anywhere near, say, the NSA building in Ft. Meade to see what sort of response that elicits.